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## THE LITERARY COMPOSITION AND FUNCTION OF PAUL'S LETTER TO THE GALATIANS<sup>1</sup>

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When discussing commentaries friends have repeatedly suggested to me that the commentary genre is at present not the most creative format within which to work. This may or may not be true, but the enterprise certainly provides for some strange experiences. It has been my experience that things go smoothly as long as one does not ask too many questions. The present paper, however, is the preliminary outcome of asking too many questions about how to arrive at an "outline" of the letter to the Galatians. Nearly all commentaries and *Introductions to the New Testament* contain such an outline, table of contents, or paraphrase of the argument. However, despite an extensive search, I have not been able to find any consideration given to possible criteria and methods for determining such an outline.

In the process of my studies I also found that the letter to the Galatians can be analyzed according to Greco-Roman rhetoric and epistolography. Apparently, this has never been realized before, with the possible exception of Joseph Barber Lightfoot. In his still valuable commentary he has an outline in which he uses the term "narrative" for the first two chapters, "argumentative" for chapters 3 and 4, and "hortatory" for 5:1–6:10. These are indeed the proper terms, if we analyze the letter according to Greco-Roman rhetoric, but Lightfoot never betrays whether or not he was aware of this fact.<sup>2</sup>

German scholarship at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was sharply divided on the question of how to classify Paul's letters, whether to classify them as literary or non-literary, and whether or not to assume influences of Hellenistic rhetoric. Although men like Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff<sup>3</sup> and Martin Dibelius<sup>4</sup> had included Paul among the great letter-writ-

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<sup>1</sup> Sections of this paper were read at the 29th General Meeting of the Society for New Testament Studies at Sigtuna, Sweden, 13 August 1974.

<sup>2</sup> Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 65–67.

<sup>3</sup> Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, "Griechische Literatur," 159ff.

<sup>4</sup> Dibelius, *Geschichte*, 5ff.

ers of antiquity, it seems that the strong opposition against such a judgement expressed by scholars like Franz Overbeck,<sup>5</sup> Paul Wendland<sup>6</sup> and Eduard Norden,<sup>7</sup> has prevailed. When one reads their arguments today, however, the heavy influence of ideology arouses suspicion. Scholars of the later twentieth century seem in basic agreement that Paul's letters are "confused," disagreeing only about whether the confusion is caused by emotional disturbances, "Diktierpausen" or "rabbinic" methodology.<sup>8</sup>

## 1. The Form of the Letter as a Whole

It is my thesis that Paul's letter to the Galatians is an example of the "apologetic letter" genre.<sup>9</sup> The evidence for this thesis must, of course, be derived from an analysis of the composition of the letter, but before we turn to this question at least a few remarks on the literary genre of the "apologetic letter" are necessary.<sup>10</sup>

The emphasis upon the interrelationships between various literary genres is one of the major contributions of Arnaldo Momigliano's 1968 lectures at Harvard University on "The Development of Greek Biography."<sup>11</sup> The genre of the "apologetic letter," which arose in the fourth century B.C.,<sup>12</sup> presupposes not only the existence of the "letter" form but also the genres of "autobiography" and "apologetic speech," which are also older forms of literary expression. In Greek literature all of these genres are represented by famous examples, of which we need to mention only Plato's *pseudo*-autobiography of Socrates, its imitation in Isocrates' *Antidosis* (*Or. 15*) (Περὶ ἀντιδόσεως), an authentic apologetic autobiography, and Demosthenes' self-apology, *De corona*. These examples inspired later writers who imitated them, e.g., Cicero in his *Brutus* or Libanius in his "Autobiography" (*Or. 1*).<sup>13</sup>

Momigliano also makes the Socratics responsible for creating the genre of the "apologetic letter,"<sup>14</sup> the most famous example of which is Plato's *Ep. 7*. The authenticity of this letter and the other Platonic letters is presently very much a matter of scholarly debate<sup>15</sup> but is of no substantive importance for the genre itself. "In any

<sup>5</sup> Overbeck, "Anfänge."

<sup>6</sup> Wendland, *Kultur*, 342ff. In regard to Galatians Wendland says (349): "Eine Exegese, die sich zum Ziele setzt, den Inhalt dieses Briefes in eine planvolle Disposition zu fassen und von logischen Gesichtspunkten ihn als Einheit zu begreifen, geht in die Irre."

<sup>7</sup> Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, 492ff.

<sup>8</sup> An example of this is Koepp, "Abraham-Midraschimkette," 181–87.

<sup>9</sup> At the outset I would like to acknowledge my great indebtedness to the members of the SBL Seminar on "The Form and Function of the Pauline Letters," in particular Nils A. Dahl, Robert W. Funk, M. Luther Stirewalt and John L. White. Although in the present paper I take a somewhat different approach, I would never have been able to do so without their continuous stimulation and gracious sharing of ideas.

<sup>10</sup> See also Betz, *Apostel Paulus*, chapter 2.

<sup>11</sup> Momigliano, *Development; Second Thoughts*.

<sup>12</sup> Momigliano, *Development*, 62.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 58–60, with further bibliography.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 60–62.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 60 n. 16, with the literature mentioned there. In addition see now the discussion about Edelstein, *Letter*; the reviews by G. Müller and Solmsen; papers by Gulley, *Authenticity*, and Aalders, *Political Thought*; and Goldstein, *Letters*, chapter 7: "The Forms of Ancient Apology and Polemic, Real and Fictitious."

case it is a remarkable attempt to combine reflections on eternal problems and personal experiences.”<sup>16</sup> The subsequent history of the genre is difficult to trace, since most of the pertinent literature did not survive.<sup>17</sup> “We cannot, therefore, see the exact place of Plato’s letter in the history of ancient autobiographical production. But one vaguely feels the Platonic precedent in Epicurus, Seneca, and perhaps St Paul.”<sup>18</sup> Momigliano’s last words—“and perhaps St Paul”—come rather unexpectedly and without any further explanation. Our analysis, however, will demonstrate that, whatever reason may have caused his remark, it is certainly correct, and that the cautious “perhaps” is no longer necessary.

## 2. The Epistolary Framework

The epistolary framework of the Galatian epistle can be easily recognized and separated from the “body”—in fact, it separates so easily that it appears almost as a kind of external bracket for the body of the letter. However, several interrelations between the epistolary framework and the body indicate that both elements are part of the same composition.<sup>19</sup>

### (a) *The Prescript (1:1–5)*

Apart from some special features, the prescript follows the basic pattern of other Pauline prescripts. The basic sequence of *superscriptio*, *adscriptio*, and *salutatio* is “Oriental” in origin and character, but shows also “Hellenistic” and specifically Christian developments. Compared with other Pauline prescripts, this one has been expanded considerably, although not as much as that of Romans. It shows the following structure:

- 1:1–2a Name of the principal sender, his title, a definition of the title, the stating of co-senders.
- 1:2b The naming of the addressees.
- 1:3–4 The salutation, expanded by christological and soteriological “formulae.”
- 1:5 A doxology, with the concluding “amen.”

### (b) *The Postscript (6:11–18)*

In 6:11–18 Paul adds a postscript in his own handwriting. This conforms to the epistolary convention of the time. An autographic postscript serves to authenticate the letter, to sum up its main points, or to add concerns which have come to the mind

<sup>16</sup> Momigliano, *Development*, 62.

<sup>17</sup> Momigliano does not mention the so-called Cynic Epistles, a body of epistolary literature that deserves to be carefully studied with regard to early Christian letters. See the editions by Hercher, *Epistolographi*, 208–17, 235–58; Reuters, *Briefe*; Mondolfo and Tarán, *Eraclito*, with bibliography. See also Strugnell and Attridge, “Epistles.”

<sup>18</sup> Momigliano, *Development*, 62.

<sup>19</sup> It is precisely at the points of expansion where we find close relations between the prescript and various parts of the body of the letter: the title and its definition (Gal 1:1), and the christological-soteriological statements (1:4).

of the sender after the completion of the letter. As soon as we go beyond these general remarks, however, questions arise.

First, the handwritten postscript presupposes that the preceding letter has been written by a “professional” amanuensis. Was the amanuensis just a copyist, or did he have an influence in the composition of the letter itself? The very fact that Paul employed an amanuensis rules out a haphazard writing of the letter and presupposes the existence of Paul’s first draft, or a sequence of draft, composition and copy. The highly skillful composition of Galatians leaves us the choice of attributing this high degree of epistolographic expertise to Paul, to the amanuensis, or to a combination of both. I am inclined to attribute the composition to Paul himself, because the letter does more than simply conform to convention. While making use of convention, it is nevertheless a highly original creation. Nowhere in it is there any indication of a separation of form and content. This is even true of the personal postscript, which is well composed in itself and fully integrated with the rest of the letter. Yet, given the employment of an amanuensis and the common practices in letter writing in Paul’s time, the problem of “authorship” may be more complicated than we have previously imagined. If one adds to this the fact that there are co-senders named in the prescript and that the “secretary” could be one of them,<sup>20</sup> the letter itself assumes more and more the character of an official document and less the character of a “private” letter.

Secondly, the postscript must be examined not only as an epistolographic convention but also as a rhetorical feature.<sup>21</sup> As a rhetorical feature, the postscript of the letter to the Galatians serves as the *peroratio* or *conclusio*,<sup>22</sup> that is, the end and conclusion of the apologetic speech forming the body of the letter.<sup>23</sup> The general purpose of the *peroratio*<sup>24</sup> is twofold: it serves as a last chance to remind the judge or the audience of the case, and it tries to make a strong emotional impression upon them. The three conventional parts of the *peroratio* carry out this task: the *enumeratio* or *recapitulatio* (ἀνακεφαλαίωσις) sharpens and sums up the main points of the case,<sup>25</sup> the *indignatio* arouses anger and hostility against the opponent,<sup>26</sup> and

<sup>20</sup> Rom 16:22: ἀσπάζομαι ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ Τέρτιος ὁ γράψας τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐν κυρίῳ.

<sup>21</sup> For matters pertaining to Greco-Roman rhetoric we have used as major tools Ernesti, *Graecorum rhetoricae*; *Latinorum rhetoricae*; Volkmann, *Rhetorik*; Lausberg, *Handbuch*, and the reviews by Dockhorn and Schmid; Leeman, *Orationis ratio*; Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*; idem, *Art of Rhetoric*, and the review by Clarke; on the “handbooks” see Fuhrmann, *Lehrbuch*.

<sup>22</sup> For a treatment of this subject see Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.19; [*Rhet. Alex.*] 20; *Rhet. Her.* 2.30.47–2.31.50; Cicero, *Inv.* 1.52.98–1.56.109; the longest discussion is found in Quintilian, *Inst.* 6.1.1ff.

<sup>23</sup> See below, section 3.

<sup>24</sup> See the treatment in Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, §27; Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§431–442.

<sup>25</sup> See Quintilian, *Inst.* 6.1.1–2 (Winterbottom): “*Rerum repetitio et congregatio, quae Graece dicitur ἀνακεφαλαίωσις, a quibusdam Latinorum enumeratio, et memoriam iudicis reficit et totam simul causam ponit ante oculos, et, etiam si per singula minus moverat, turba valet. In hac quae repetemus quam brevissime dicenda sunt, et, quod Graeco verbo patet, decurrendum per capita.*” Cicero, *Inv.* 1.53.98 (Hubbel, LCL): “*Enumeratio est per quam res disperse et diffuse dictae unum in locum coguntur et reminiscendi causa unum sub aspectum subiciuntur.*” See for more material Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§334–435.

<sup>26</sup> See Cicero, *Inv.* 1.53.100: “*Indignatio est oratio per quam conficitur ut in aliquem hominem magnum odium aut in rem gravis offensus concitetur.*” See also Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §438.

the *conquestio* stimulates pity.<sup>27</sup> In an actual case, the *peroratio* can, of course, take many different forms, but it must conform to the case at issue, and it must be concise. It also must be clearly related to the individual parts of the speech, especially to the *exordium*.<sup>28</sup>

When we look at Paul's postscript (6:11–18) as a *peroratio*, some very interesting structures emerge, all confirming that we do, in fact, have this part of a speech before us.

- 6:11 The epistolary "formula" announcing and introducing the postscript.
- 6:12–17 A *peroratio*, which is almost identical with the *recapitulatio*.<sup>29</sup> Quintilian mentions that for certain "Greek" orators this was a preferred form.<sup>30</sup> Paul's *peroratio* is primarily a *recapitulatio* while others use the *recapitulatio* as only a part of the *peroratio*.
- 6:12–13 A sharp polemic against the opponents, denouncing them not only as "heretics" but also as "morally" inferior and despicable. This is clearly an expression of *indignatio*, with a good dose of *amplificatio*.<sup>31</sup> Its relation to the *causa* (1:6f.) is equally obvious.<sup>32</sup>
- 6:14 Restatement of Paul's own theological position, as he has advocated it throughout the letter.<sup>33</sup>
- 6:15 The κανών for the Galatians to follow in the future.<sup>34</sup> This κανών sums up the entire paraenetical direction advocated by Paul in the letter.<sup>35</sup>
- 6:16 A conditional blessing upon those who follow the κανών (6:14f.). This conditional blessing implies also a threat against those who do not intend to follow the Pauline κανών and who consequently fall under the curse (1:8–9). Quintilian recommends the inclusion of a threat in the *peroratio*, as he does for the *exordium*.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>27</sup> See Cicero, *Inv.* 1.55.106: "*Conquestio est oratio auditorum misericordiam captans*." See also Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §439.

<sup>28</sup> See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §432.

<sup>29</sup> That the final section of Gal conforms to the *enumeratio*, *indignatio* and *conquestio* and that Paul was influenced by Greek rhetoric has been proposed already by Starcke, "Rhetorik"; Stogiannou, "Ἀνακεφαλαίωσις"; differently Bahr, "Subscriptions."

<sup>30</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 6.1.7 (see the quotation below).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *Rhet. Her.* 2.30.47: "*Amplificatio est res quae per locum communem instigationis auditorum causa sumitur*." In 2.30.48 ten *loci communes* to be applied are listed; similarly Cicero, *Inv.* 1.53.101ff. See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §438.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Gal 2:4–5, 11–14; 3:1; 5:7, 10–12.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. esp. Gal 1:1, 11–12; 2:19–21; 4:12; 5:2, 10, 11; 6:17.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 6.1.22.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. esp. 2:4–5, 11–14; 5:4–6, 25. It is interesting that according to Plutarch, *Adv. Col.* 1118b, and Cicero, *Fin.* 1.19.53, Epicurus' Canons were believed to have come down from heaven (διοπετεῖς). See J. Schneider, "Brief," *RAC* 2:572f.

<sup>36</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 6.1.13: "*Metus etiam, si est adhibendus, ut faciat idem, hunc habet locum fortiolem quam in proemio*." Cf. 4.1.20–21 and see below.

- 6:17 Paul concludes the *peroratio* with an apostolic “order” in regard to the future coupled with his self-description as a representative of the crucified Christ.<sup>37</sup> Paul’s reason for making this remark at this point becomes understandable if we are anticipating the *conquestio*. Although reduced to a minimum, 6:17 does have the appearance of a *conquestio*. Among the examples mentioned by Quintilian as having been employed most effectively by Cicero is one that points out the defendant’s “worth, his manly pursuits, the scars from wounds received in battle . . .” as a recommendation to the judge.<sup>38</sup> Gal 6:17 is such a *conquestio*, for it points to the στίγματα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ with which Paul has been inflicted as a result of his apostolic mission, a mission which is identical with the case presented.<sup>39</sup> However, it also is clear that Paul does not openly appeal for pity. Perhaps the lack of such an emotional appeal is due to the fact that, as Quintilian reports:

The majority of Athenians and almost all philosophers who have left anything in writing on the art of oratory have held that the recapitulation is the sole form of peroration. I imagine that the reason why the Athenians did so was that appeals to the emotions were forbidden to Athenian orators, a proclamation to this effect being actually made by the court-usher. I am less surprised at the philosophers taking this view, for they regard susceptibility to emotion as a vice, and think it immoral that the judge should be distracted from the truth by an appeal to his emotions and that it is unbecoming for a good man to make use of vicious procedure to serve his ends. None the less they must admit that appeals to emotion are necessary if there are no other means for securing the victory of truth, justice and the public interest.<sup>40</sup>

Paul’s restraint at this point with regard to the emotional appeal may reflect the same kind of caution which, according to Quintilian, was characteristic of philosophers.<sup>41</sup>

- 6:18 The letter concludes with a final benediction and an “amen.” Both are part of the epistolary framework which we also find in other Pauline letters.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Gal 1:1, 12, 16; 2:19f.; 4:14; 5:24; 6:14.

<sup>38</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 6.1.21 (Butler). Its connection with the “catalogue of περιστάσεις” should be noted. See Betz, *Apostel Paulus*, 97ff.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Gal 1:13, 23; 4:29; 5:11; 6:12.

<sup>40</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 6.1.7 (Butler).

<sup>41</sup> The refusal to ask for mercy was attributed to Socrates (cf. Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.4.4) and subsequently became part of the Socratic tradition. This tradition has influenced Paul, as I have shown in *Apostel Paulus*, 15ff.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Rom 16:20; 1 Thess 5:28; 1 Cor 16:23; 2 Cor 13:13; Phil 4:23; Phlm 25.

### 3. The Body of the Letter (1:6–6:10)

#### (a) *The Exordium* (1:6–11)

The “body”<sup>43</sup> of Paul’s letter begins on a note of ironic indignation, expressed by the words “I am astonished that . . .,”<sup>44</sup> and then states what the apostle regards as the cause for writing the letter: “that you are so quickly deserting him who called you in [the] grace of Christ [and turning] to a different gospel—not that there is another [gospel]; but there are some who disturb you and want to pervert the gospel of Christ.” This statement of the *causa* of the case, the reason why the letter was written, contains the “facts” that occasioned the letter, but these “facts” are stated with a partisan bias. This is indicated by the self-correction<sup>45</sup> in v. 7, where Paul denies that there is another gospel, and by the “political” language of vv. 6–7,<sup>46</sup> which describes the actions taken by the Galatians as “desertion” (μετατιθέναι) and those taken by the opposition as “creating disturbance” (παράσσειν) and “turning things upside down” (μεταστρέψαι). This language is no doubt intended to discredit the opponents in the eyes of the addressees and to censure the Galatians for their own disloyalty.

Generally speaking this first part of the body of the Galatian letter conforms to the customary *exordium*, which is otherwise known as the *prooemium* or *principium*.<sup>47</sup> In the treatment of the *exordium* in Aristotle’s *Rhetorica*,<sup>48</sup> the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*,<sup>49</sup> Cicero’s *De inventione rhetorica*<sup>50</sup> and Quintilian,<sup>51</sup> there is considerable agreement in regard to the definition, composition and function of the *exordium*. This includes the understanding that various types of *exordia* must be distinguished and applied in accordance with the nature of the case. There is some disagreement and development among these authors in determining what the various types are and when they can best be applied.

Aristotle advises that if the audience is already attentive, the speaker may start his speech by directly introducing a summary of the “facts.”<sup>52</sup> The *Rhetorica ad Herennium*<sup>53</sup>

<sup>43</sup> I am disagreeing here with White, “Introductory Formulae,” who has the body of the letter begin with 1:11 (93, 94). The difference comes about because White takes “the private Greek letters of the papyri as a basis of comparison” (62). Our analysis shows that this basis is too small for a comparison with Paul. The clarification of the relationship between the “private” letters on papyrus, the “literary” letters and rhetoric is another problem of research.

<sup>44</sup> Θαυμάζω is a familiar rhetorical expression which became an epistolary cliché. It occurs often, e.g., in Demosthenes, Antiphon and Lysias. See Preuss, *Index demosthenicus*, s.v.; Holmes, *Index lysiacus*, s.v. Cf. also Plato, *Apol.* 17A, 24A; *Crito* 50C. For the epistles, see, e.g., Isocrates, *Ep.* 2.19; 9.8; also White, “Introductory Formulae,” 96; for the term in connection with the exordium, see Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §270. A large collection is also found in Dahl, “Paul’s Letter.”

<sup>45</sup> On the *correctio* see Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§784–786.

<sup>46</sup> For parallel language cf. Isocrates, *Ep.* 7.12f.

<sup>47</sup> On the *exordium*, see esp. Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, §12; Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§263–288.

<sup>48</sup> Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.1.9 (1354b); 3.14.1ff. (1419b19ff.); cf. [*Rhet. Alex.*] 29ff. (1436a32ff.).

<sup>49</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 1.4.6–1.7.11.

<sup>50</sup> Cicero, *Inv.* 1.15.20–1.17.25.

<sup>51</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.1–79.

<sup>52</sup> Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.14.8 (1413b). Cf. [*Rhet. Alex.*] 29 (1437b35ff.).

<sup>53</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 1.4.7: “Dociles auditores habere poterimus, si summam causae breviter exponemus et si adtentos eos faciemus.”

names the summary of the *causa* as a means for making the hearers attentive and receptive. The handbook sets forth four methods for making the hearers well disposed: “by discussing our own person, the person of our adversaries, that of our hearers, and the facts themselves.”<sup>54</sup> But in 1:6–7, Paul does more than simply present the bare facts. He also discredits his adversaries by using the language of demagoguery<sup>55</sup> and expresses his disappointment and disapproval of the Galatians for changing over to the side of the opposition.<sup>56</sup> Speaking in the terms of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Paul’s statement of the *causa* is a mixture of two types of *exordia*, the *principium* (“Direct Opening”) and the *insinuatio* (“Subtle Approach”). The former, the *principium*, is appropriate in addressing an audience where attention, receptivity and a favorable disposition can be obtained directly and without difficulty,<sup>57</sup> while the *insinuatio* should be used in cases where, for example, the audience has been won over by the previous speech of the opponent.<sup>58</sup> Paul’s case stands in the middle: he can be certain of having the attention and receptivity of the Galatians at once, but they have almost been won over, though not quite.<sup>59</sup> This mixture of the *principium* and the *insinuatio* may be peculiar, but it conforms precisely to the situation with which Paul sees himself confronted.

Cicero’s treatment in his *De inventione* is very similar to the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Without going into the problems of the relationship between the two works,<sup>60</sup> it may suffice to mention that Cicero has greater tolerance of variability and mixture of cases and types. He places great emphasis upon discrediting the opposition. In comparison with Paul, it is noteworthy that he recommends the expression of astonishment and perplexity as one of the means to regain the goodwill of an audience which has been won over by the opposition.<sup>61</sup>

The next section of the Galatian *exordium* (1:8–9) contains a double curse, issued conditionally upon those who preach a gospel different from the Pauline gos-

<sup>54</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 1.4.8: “*Benivolos auditores facere quattuor modis possumus: ab nostra, ab adversariorum nostrorum, ab auditorum persona, et ab rebus ipsis.*” Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.14.7 (1415a); Cicero, *Inv.* 1.16.22.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *Rhet. Her.* 1.5.8: “*Ab adversariorum persona benivolentia captabitur si eos in odium, in invidiam, in contemptionem adducemus. In odium rapiemus si quid eorum spurce, superbe, perfidiose, crudeliter, confidenter, malitiose, flagitiose factum proferemus. In invidiam trahemus si vim, si potentiam, si factionem, divitias, incontinentiam, nobilitatem, clientelas, hospitium, sodalitatem, adfinitates adversariorum proferemus, et his adiumentis magis quam veritati eos confidere aperiemus. In contemptionem adducemus si inertiam, ignaviam, desidiā, luxuriam adversariorum proferemus.*”

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.14.2 (1414b), who names as the sources of epideictic *exordia* ἔπαινος ἢ ψόγος (cf. 3.14.4 [1415a]).

<sup>57</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 1.4.6: “*Principium est cum statim auditoris animum nobis idoneum reddimus ad audiendum. Id ita sumitur ut adtentos, ut dociles, uti benivolos auditores habere possimus.*”

<sup>58</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 1.6.9: “*Tria sunt tempora quibus principio uti non possumus, quae diligenter sunt considerata: aut cum turpem causam habemus, hoc est, cum ipsa res animum auditoris a nobis alienat; aut cum animus auditoris persuasus esse videtur ab iis qui ante contra dixerunt.*”

<sup>59</sup> Note the present tense in Gal 1:6–7; 4:9, 21; also 4:11, 12–20; 5:1, 4, 7–12, 13; 6:12–16.

<sup>60</sup> See Adamietz, *Ciceros De inventione*.

<sup>61</sup> Cicero, *Inv.* 1.17.25: “*Sin oratio adversariorum fidem videbitur auditoribus fecisse—id quod ei qui intelliget quibus rebus fides fiat facile erit cognitu—oportet aut . . . aut dubitatione uti quid primum dicas aut cui potissimum loco respondeas, cum admiratione. Nam auditor cum eum quem adversarii perturbatum putavit oratione videt animo firmissimo contra dicere paratum, plerumque se potius temere assensisse quam illum sine causa confidere arbitratur.*”

pel. The way Paul states this curse indicates that he merely repeats (v. 9: ὡς προειρήκαμεν, καὶ ἄρτι πάλιν λέγω) a curse which had been issued at some earlier occasion (v. 8), so that what appears now as a double curse is really the reissuing of a previous curse. Also, this curse must be seen in connection with the conditional blessing in the postscript (6:16), a matter to which we will return later.<sup>62</sup>

How does this curse fit into the *exordium*? In his treatment of the *exordium* Quintilian discusses devices to be employed in cases where the judge is influenced by prejudice, most likely through the previous speech of an opponent.<sup>63</sup> One effective method, for which Cicero is cited as an example, is to frighten the judge by threats. Most popular was the move to threaten the judge with the displeasure of the Roman people or, more brutally, with prosecution for bribery.<sup>64</sup> Quintilian regards such threats as extreme measures which should be used only as a last resort, since in his view they lie outside of the art of oratory.<sup>65</sup> Such threats, a form of which must have been the curse, may have been used more often than Quintilian would like. It is significant that one of the greatest masterpieces of Greek rhetoric, Demosthenes' *De corona*, has as its *peroratio* a prayer to the gods which includes a curse upon the enemies of Athens.<sup>66</sup> Demosthenes has the curse in the end, in the *peroratio*, while Paul has it as part of the *exordium*, but since *exordium* and *peroratio* were considered intimately related, the difference is insignificant.<sup>67</sup>

The conclusion of the *exordium* is apparently reached in v. 9, while the next major section, the *narratio*, begins in v. 12. This leaves us with the question of what to do with vv. 10–11. Scholars have been divided in their opinions on whether v. 10 should be connected with the preceding or with the following, and whether the following section begins in v. 11 or v. 12. A clear decision seems impossible unless one recognizes that, according to the rhetoricians, there should be a smooth transition between the *exordium* and the *narratio*.<sup>68</sup>

The most extensive discussion on this point is found in Quintilian,<sup>69</sup> who calls this transitional part *transitus*<sup>70</sup> or *transgressio*.<sup>71</sup> The purpose of this *narratio* is to provide an end to the *exordium*, which is distinguishable but in harmony with the

<sup>62</sup> See section 4, below.

<sup>63</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.20–22.

<sup>64</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.21: "Sed adhibendi modus alter ille frequens et favorabilis, ne male sentiat populus Romanus, ne iudicia transferantur, alter autem asper et rarus, quo minatur corruptis accusationem."

<sup>65</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.22: "Quod si necessitas exiget, non erit iam ex arte oratoria, non magis quam appellare, etiamsi id quoque saepe utile est, aut antequam pronuntiet reum facere; nam et minari et deferre etiam non orator potest."

<sup>66</sup> Demosthenes, *Cor.* 18.324 (Vince, LCL): Μὴ δῆτ', ὦ πάντες θεοί, μηδεὶς ταῦθ' ὑμῶν ἐπινεύσειεν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν καὶ τούτοις βελτίω τινὰ νοῦν καὶ φρένας ἐνθείητε, εἰ δ' ἄρ' ἔχουσιν ἀνιάτως, τούτους μὲν αὐτοὺς καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐξώλεις καὶ προώλεις ἐν γῇ καὶ θαλλάττῃ ποιήσατε, ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς τὴν ταχίστην ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν ἐπηρτημένων φόβων δότε καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.&&&

<sup>67</sup> On the *peroratio* see section 2 (b) above.

<sup>68</sup> See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §288.

<sup>69</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.76–79.

<sup>70</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.77.

<sup>71</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.78.

beginning of the *narratio*.<sup>72</sup> An abrupt change from one part to the next is to be avoided, as well as the complete smoothing out of any differences.<sup>73</sup> In addition, the transition should contain an announcement of the major topic of the *narratio*.<sup>74</sup>

Verses 10–11 meet these requirements very well. The two rhetorical questions and the assertion in v. 10 put a clear end to the *exordium*. They deny that Paul is a rhetorical “flatterer,”<sup>75</sup> “persuading” (ἀνθρώπους πείθω) or “pleasing” men (ἀνθρώπους ἀρέσκειν),<sup>76</sup> or a magician, trying to “persuade God” (πείθω τὸν θεόν).<sup>77</sup> Verse 11 then introduces<sup>78</sup> what is going to be Paul’s contention in the *narratio*: γνωρίζω γὰρ ὑμῖν, ἀδελφοί, τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον.

### (b) The Narratio (1:12–2:14)

As the Greco-Roman rhetoricians recommend, Paul’s *exordium* (1:6–11) is followed by the “statement of facts” (διήγησις, *narratio*).<sup>79</sup> In discussing Paul’s *narratio* (1:12–2:14) one must keep in mind that, as Quintilian says, “there is no single law or fixed rule governing the method of defense. We must consider what is most advantageous in the circumstances and nature of the case. . . .”<sup>80</sup> Consequently the handbooks contain wide-ranging discussions with room for considerable differences of opinion going back to the various schools of rhetorical theory.

Cicero’s treatment of the subject in *Inv.* 1.19.27–31.30 contains what may be regarded as a summary of the *communis opinio*. He starts by providing a general definition of “narrative”: “The *narrative* is an exposition of events that have occurred or are supposed to have occurred.”<sup>81</sup> He then distinguishes between three types (*genera*) of narrative, the first of which applies to Galatians: “that form of narrative which contains an exposition of a case at law.”<sup>82</sup> Nearly all writers of the period agree that such

<sup>72</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.76: “. . . id debet in principio postremum esse cui commodissime iungi initium sequentium poterit.”

<sup>73</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.79: “Quapropter, ut non abrupte cadere in narrationem, ita non obscure transcendere est optimum.”

<sup>74</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.79: “Si vero longior sequetur ac perplexa magis expositio, ad eam ipsam praeparandus erit iudex.”

<sup>75</sup> See, e.g., Demosthenes, *Exord.* 1.3; 19; 26.2; Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.1.9, 55–60. Cf. also Quintilian’s polemic against Ovid (*Inst.* 4.1.77f.): “Illa vero frigida et puerilis est in scholis adfectatio, ut ipse transitus efficiat aliquam utique sententiam et huius velut praestigiae plausum petat. . . .” The rejection of rhetorical tricks at the beginning of a speech was part of rhetoric. See, furthermore, Betz, *Apostel Paulus*, 15ff., 57ff.

<sup>76</sup> Both phrases describe the “art of rhetoric.” See, e.g., Plato, *Gorg.* 452E; *Prot.* 352E; and Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §257.

<sup>77</sup> Cf., e.g., Plato, *Resp.* 364C; and the proverb quoted in 390E.

<sup>78</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 4.26.35 provides examples of *transitio*, in which what follows next is set forth; e.g.: “Mea in istum beneficia cognoscitis; nunc quomodo iste mihi gratiam rettulerit accipite.”

<sup>79</sup> On the *narratio* see Schafer, “De rhetorum praeceptis”; Loheit, “Untersuchungen”; Volkman, *Rhetorik*, §13; Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§289–347.

<sup>80</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.84 (Butler): “Neque enim est una lex defensionis certumque praescriptum: pro re, pro tempore intuenda quae prosint. . . .”

<sup>81</sup> Cicero, *Inv.* 1.19.27 (Hubbell): “Narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expositio.” Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.31 (see below). See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §289 for other definitions.

<sup>82</sup> Cicero, *Inv.* 1.20.28: “Nunc de narratione ea quae causae continet expositionem dicendum videtur.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §290, 1.

a “narrative” ought to possess three necessary qualities (*virtutes necessariae*): “it should be brief, clear, and plausible.”<sup>83</sup> In Cicero,<sup>84</sup> the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*,<sup>85</sup> and especially Quintilian<sup>86</sup> we find extensive discussions about how such qualities can best be achieved.

Several points in Quintilian’s discussion of the *narratio* are directly relevant for Paul. The first of these points addresses the question of whether or not the *narratio* is dispensable in certain cases.<sup>87</sup> Contrary to others, Quintilian takes the position that the *narratio* should not be omitted even when the accused simply denies the charge.<sup>88</sup> Indeed, in Gal 1:11ff. we have both a strong denial (vv. 11f.) and a longer *narratio* (1:13–2:14).

Quintilian’s explanation, for which he can rely on the highest authorities,<sup>89</sup> makes clear why the short sentence of a denial is not an adequate “statement of facts.”<sup>90</sup> The denial must not simply contradict the charge made by the opponent. Instead, the denial should introduce the subject matter on which the defense wishes to be judged.<sup>91</sup> It is part of the defense strategy. The *narratio*, on the other hand, is more than simply a narrative form of the denial.<sup>92</sup> In fact, the *narratio* may not even explicitly mention the charge. Its purpose is to deal with the facts that have a bearing on the case, in order to make the denial plausible.<sup>93</sup>

If this has a bearing on Paul, one should exercise caution and not simply conclude from v. 11 that the charge against Paul was in fact that his gospel was κατὰ ἄνθρωπον. Rather, this denial is part of his defense strategy. In v. 12 the simple denial of v. 11 is made more explicit: οὐδὲ ἔστιν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον (v. 11) means negatively: οὐδὲ . . . ἐγὼ παρὰ ἀνθρώπου παρέλαβον οὔτε ἐδιδάχθην, and positively: δι’ ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (v. 12).<sup>94</sup> The *narratio* proper begins in v. 13, substantiating the claims made in v. 12 by appropriate “facts.” However, neither the denial nor the charge is explicitly mentioned in 1:13–2:14. The reason for this can only be that the “facts” of 1:13–2:14 serve to make the denial (1:11f.) credible in the eyes of the addressees of the letter.

Another point of relevance concerns the beginning of the *narratio*, which intends “not merely to instruct, but rather to persuade the judge.”<sup>95</sup> Quintilian recommends

<sup>83</sup> Cicero, *Inv.* 1.20.28: “Oportet igitur eam tres habere res: ut brevis, ut aperta, ut probabilis sit.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§294–334.

<sup>84</sup> Cicero, *Inv.* 1.20.28–1.21.30.

<sup>85</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 1.8.12–1.10.16.

<sup>86</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.2–132.

<sup>87</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.4ff.

<sup>88</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.9: “Sed ut has aliquando non narrandi causas puto, sic ab illis dissentio qui non existimant esse narrationem cum reus quod obicitur tantum negat.”

<sup>89</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.9ff.

<sup>90</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.12: “‘Non occidi hominem’: nulla narratio est; convenit: . . .”

<sup>91</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.1: “. . . res de qua pronuntiaturus est indicetur.”

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.10.

<sup>93</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.11: “Ego autem magnos alioqui secutus auctores duas esse in iudicii narrationum species existimo, alteram ipsius causae, alteram in rerum ad causam pertinentium expositione.” Examples are given in 4.2.12–18.

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Gal 1:1.

<sup>95</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.21: “Neque enim narratio in hoc reperta est, ut tantum cognoscat iudex, sed aliquanto magis ut consentiat.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§300–301, 308.

beginning the *narratio* with a statement, the *propositio*,<sup>96</sup> which will influence the judge in some way, even though he may be well informed about the case.<sup>97</sup> He mentions examples like these: “I know that you are aware . . .”; “You remember . . .”; “You are not ignorant of the fact . . .”; etc.<sup>98</sup> Which one of these one chooses depends entirely upon how one can best influence the judge.

Paul announces his *narratio* with the words γνωρίζω γὰρ ὑμῖν, ἀδελφοί (v. 11), thus conforming to Quintilian’s advice. We must conclude, therefore, that the term γνωρίζειν does not simply announce information, but by pretending to tell the Galatians something new in fact reminds them of something they no doubt know, but would at this time rather forget.<sup>99</sup>

As to the “facts” themselves, Quintilian provides a more explicit definition than Cicero, saying that “The *statement of facts* consists in the persuasive exposition of that which either has been done, or is supposed to have been done, or, to quote the definition given by Apollodorus, is a speech instructing the audience as to the nature of the case in dispute.”<sup>100</sup> Consequently, the facts themselves, as well as their delivery, are subjected to partisan interest.<sup>101</sup> The three qualities of lucidity, brevity, and plausibility serve no other purpose.<sup>102</sup> This does not mean that the facts are necessarily false. On the contrary, a statement that is wholly in our favor is most plausible when it is true.<sup>103</sup> But truth is not always credible, nor is the credible always true. In short, whether the facts are true or fictitious, the effort required to make them believable is the same.<sup>104</sup>

Most of the remaining discussion of the *narratio* by the rhetoricians is devoted to the explanation of the three qualities.<sup>105</sup> Quintilian begins with “lucidity” or “clearness.”<sup>106</sup> This quality is ensured by first choosing “words appropriate, significant and free from meanness” and by avoiding the “farfetched or unusual”; secondly, by the “distinct account of facts, persons, times, places and causes.”<sup>107</sup> The delivery

<sup>96</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.9.5; 4.8.7, 30; its purpose is defined 3.9.2: “*proponere quidem quae sis probaturus necesse est.*” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §289.

<sup>97</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.21: “*Quare etiam si non erit docendus sed aliquo modo adficiendus narrabimus, cum praeparatione quadam.*”

<sup>98</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.8.21–23.

<sup>99</sup> See also the beginning of the *narratio* in Demosthenes’ *De corona* (18.17): ἔστι δ’ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ προσήκον ἴσως, ὥς κατ’ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους εἶχε τὰ πράγματ’ ἀναμνησάσαι, ἵνα πρὸς τὸν ὑπάρχοντα καιρὸν ἕκαστα θεωρήτε.

<sup>100</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.31 (Butler): “*Narratio est rei factae aut ut factae utilis ad persuadendum expositio, vel, ut Apollodorus finit, oratio docens auditorem quid in controversia sit.*” See on definitions Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §289.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.33. See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§289, 308.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.31–33. See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §294.

<sup>103</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.34: “. . . quod proposuerim eam quae sit tota pro nobis debere esse veri similem cum vera sit.” Cf. J. Sanders, “‘Autobiographical’ Statements.”

<sup>104</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.34: “*Sunt enim plurima vera quidem, sed parum credibilia, sicut falsa quoque frequenter veri similia. Quare non minus laborandum est ut iudex quae vere dicimus quam quae fingimus credat.*”

<sup>105</sup> See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§294–334.

<sup>106</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.31, 36. See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§315–321.

<sup>107</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.3.36: “*Erit autem narratio aperta atque dilucida si fuerit primum exposita verbis propriis et significantibus et non sordidis quidem, non tamen exquisitis et ab usu remotis, tum distincta rebus personis temporibus locis causis.*”

must conform to this quality, so that the judge will readily accept it.<sup>108</sup> At this point Quintilian wants to eliminate all rhetorical tricks and gimmickry normally employed to evoke the applause of the crowds.<sup>109</sup> It is when the speaker gives the impression of absolute truth that his rhetoric is best.<sup>110</sup> One would have to say that Paul's narration conforms to these requirements.<sup>111</sup>

The quality of "brevity"<sup>112</sup> will be achieved, "if in the first place we start at the point of the case at which it begins to concern the judge, secondly avoid irrelevance, and finally cut out everything the removal of which neither hampers the activities of the judge nor harms our own case."<sup>113</sup> As Quintilian sees it, "brevity" should not be misunderstood as the excision of necessary information: "I mean not saying less, but not saying more than occasion demands."<sup>114</sup> If brevity is misunderstood as excessive abridgement, the *narratio* loses its power of persuasion and becomes meaningless.<sup>115</sup> If the case requires a longer statement, various means of avoiding tediousness should be employed.<sup>116</sup> Among the measures Quintilian recommends is the division of the statement into several sections, thereby creating the impression of several short statements instead of one long one.<sup>117</sup>

It is apparent that Paul follows this recommendation. His case requires a long statement of facts, since he has to cover his entire history from his birth on. He begins with his birth because it is relevant to the case. Then he covers the history of the problem, which one must know in order to understand the *causa* (1:6), by subdivisions. His *narratio* has roughly three parts, a method of division which seems to have been popular.<sup>118</sup> The first section (1:13–24) covers a long period of time and is divided up into several subsections. The middle section is somewhat shorter, reporting on the so-called Apostolic Council (2:1–10). The final section contains just a brief episode, the conflict at Antioch (2:11–14). In this way Paul is able to cover the long history of the problem, saying all that is necessary to know for the case, while leaving out all unrelated material. The account is brief, but not excessively concise. It is a lively and dramatic narrative, but there is no superfluous embellishment or ornament. The information given has no other purpose than to support the denial (1:11f.).

The most difficult task is, of course, to make the *narratio* "credible."<sup>119</sup> In principle Quintilian suggests that this quality will be achieved, "if in the first place we take

<sup>108</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.3.36.

<sup>109</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.37–39.

<sup>110</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.38: "tum autem optime dicit orator cum videtur vera dicere."

<sup>111</sup> See esp. Gal 1:10 and the oath 1:20.

<sup>112</sup> See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§297–314.

<sup>113</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.40: "Brevis erit narratio ante omnia si inde coeperimus rem exponere unde ad iudicem pertinet, deinde si nihil extra causam dixerimus, tum etiam si reciderimus omnia quibus sublati neque cognitioni quicquam neque utilitati detrahatur."

<sup>114</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.43: "Nos autem brevitatem in hoc ponimus, non ut minus sed ne plus dicatur quam oporteat." Cf. Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§298–308.

<sup>115</sup> See Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.41–47.

<sup>116</sup> See Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.47–51.

<sup>117</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.49–50: "Et partitio taedium levat: . . . ita tres potius modicae narrationes videbuntur quam una longa." Cf. Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§299–307, 311.

<sup>118</sup> See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §338.

<sup>119</sup> See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§322–334.

care to say nothing contrary to nature, secondly if we assign reasons and motives for the facts on which the inquiry turns (it is unnecessary to do so with the subsidiary facts as well), and if we make the characters of the actors in keeping with the facts we desire to be believed.”<sup>120</sup> Among the specific devices Quintilian recommends, we notice that it is “useful to scatter some hints of our proofs here and there, but in such a way that it is never forgotten that we are making a *statement of facts* and not a proof.”<sup>121</sup> Simple and brief arguments may be thrown in, but these should be taken as only preparatory for the arguments to be developed in the *probatio*.<sup>122</sup> Such remarks should remain part of the *narratio*, since they are most effective when they are not recognizable as arguments.<sup>123</sup> Again, Paul’s *narratio* seems to obey the main rules of theory. Motivation and reason are provided for the major “facts” (revelations in 1:15f.; 2:1; ὅτι κατεγνωσμένος ἦν in 2:11), but not for the subsidiary ones (1:17, 18, 21). Persons are characterized in conformity with the events (the “false brothers” in 2:4; the δοκοῦντες in 2:6; the ὑπόκρισις of Cephas, Barnabas, and the “other Jews” in 2:11–14). Scattered throughout the *narratio*, but remaining subject to it, are hints of proofs and small arguments (e.g., 1:13 ἠκούσατε; 1:23 ἀκούοντες ἦσαν; 1:20 an oath; 2:3, 4, 5, 6, etc.). The entire *narratio* is so designed that it makes the introductory statement (1:11f.) credible.

Among the further points in Quintilian’s discussion, two deserve special attention as far as Paul is concerned. First, Quintilian disagrees with the general rule that the order of events in the *narratio* should always follow the actual order of events.<sup>124</sup> He himself wants to subject the order of events in the *narratio* to the rationale of expediency, which seems logical. But his examples show that he would indicate to the judge the order in which the events occurred.<sup>125</sup> With this being the exception, Quintilian reaffirms the general rule, saying that “this is no reason for not following the order of events as a general rule.”<sup>126</sup> If we apply this to Paul, he apparently follows the natural order of events in 1:13–2:14, since there is no indication that he does not.<sup>127</sup> The other remark pertains to the conclusion of the *narratio*. Quintilian again goes against the practice of the majority of rhetoricians. The majority rule says that the *narratio* should “end where the issue to be deter-

<sup>120</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.52: “Credibilis autem erit narratio ante omnia si prius consuluerimus nostrum animum ne quid naturae dicamus adversum, deinde si causas ac rationes factis praeposuerimus, non omnibus, sed de quibus quaeritur, si personas convenientes iis quae facta credi volumus constituerimus.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §338.

<sup>121</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.54: “Ne illud quidem fuerit inutile, semina quaedam probationum spargere, verum sic ut narrationem esse meminerimus, non probationem.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §324.

<sup>122</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.54. See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §324.

<sup>123</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.57: “Optimae vero praeparationes erunt quae latuerint.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §325.

<sup>124</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.83: “Namque ne iis quidem accedo qui semper eo putant ordine quo quid actum sit esse narrandum, sed eo malo narrare quo expedit.”

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.83–85.

<sup>126</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.87: “Neque ideo tamen non saepius id facere oportebit ut rerum ordinem sequamur.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §317.

<sup>127</sup> This rhetorical argument goes against the hypothesis of Zahn, *Galater*, 110ff., that the Antioch episode took place before the Jerusalem meeting. Cf. Munck, *Paul*, 74f., 100ff.

mined begins.”<sup>128</sup> It cannot be accidental that at the end of the *narratio* in Gal 2:14, when Paul formulates the dilemma Cephas has got himself into, this dilemma<sup>129</sup> is identical with the issue the Galatians themselves have to decide: πῶς τὰ ἔθνη ἀναγκάζεις ἰουδαΐζειν;<sup>130</sup>

(c) *The Propositio* (2:15–21)

Between the *narratio* and the *probatio* rhetoricians insert the *propositio* (the name Quintilian uses).<sup>131</sup> Quintilian has the fullest account of this part of the speech, but again he takes a special position in applying it. We find the general view in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and in Cicero’s *De inventione rhetorica*, although there is also considerable difference between them. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* provides for two kinds of statements after the *narratio*: “. . . first to make clear what we and our opponents agree upon, if there is agreement on the points useful to us, and what remains contested. . . .”<sup>132</sup> Then comes the *distributio* in two parts, the *enumeratio* and the *expositio*, the former announcing the number of points to be discussed, the latter setting forth these points briefly and completely.<sup>133</sup> The function of the *propositio* is twofold; it sums up the legal content of the *narratio* by this outline of the case and provides an easy transition to the *probatio*.<sup>134</sup>

Gal 2:15–21 conforms to the form, function, and requirements of the *propositio*. Placed at the end of the last episode of the *narratio* (2:11–14), it sums up the *narratio*’s material content. But it is not part of the *narratio*,<sup>135</sup> and it sets up the arguments to be discussed later in the *probatio* (chapters 3 and 4).<sup>136</sup> The points of presumable agreement are set forth first (2:15f.). Paul may use the language of the opposition in v. 15, but the summary of the doctrine of justification by faith (v. 16) is entirely Pauline; yet it is made to appear as the logical conclusion one would draw

<sup>128</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.2.132: “De fine narrationis cum iis contentio est qui perducitur expositionem volunt eo unde quaestio oritur.” Cf. Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §307.

<sup>129</sup> On the dilemma (*complexio*) see Cicero, *Inv.* 1.29.45, with good examples. See also Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §393.

<sup>130</sup> The connection of this question with the *causa* (1:6f.) of the *exordium* and with the *peroratio* of the *postscriptum* (6:12–16) should be noted because it also conforms to rhetorical theory (cf. Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§431–442). Cf. also 2:3 (*narratio*) and 5:2 (beginning of the *paraenesis*). Paul’s own position is antithetical: cf. 1:7 (*causa*); 2:3, 5 (*narratio*); 2:15–21 (*propositio*); 4:9, 11, 19–21 (*argumentatio*); 5:1–12, esp. 6 (*paraenesis*); 6:15 (*recapitulatio*).

<sup>131</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.4.1–4.5.26; Cicero, *Inv.* 1.22.31–1.23.33 calls it *partitio*, while the *Rhet. Her.* 1.10.17 uses *divisio*. See Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, §15; Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §346; Adamietz, *Ciceros De inventione*, 36ff.

<sup>132</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 1.10.17: “Causarum divisio in duas partes distributa est. Primum perorata narratione debemus aperire quid nobis conveniat cum adversariis, si ea quae utilia sunt nobis convenient, quid in controversia relictum sit.” Cf. Cicero, *Inv.* 1.22.31.

<sup>133</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 1.10.17: “Expositio est cum res quibus de rebus dicturi sumus exponimus breviter et absolute.” Cf. Cicero, *Inv.* 1.22.32; Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.5.26–28.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.4.1: “Mihi autem propositio videtur omnis confirmationis initium, quod non modo in ostendenda quaestione principali, sed nonnunquam etiam in singulis argumentis poni solet.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§343–345.

<sup>135</sup> This formal argument would then also decide the old controversy, whether or not vv. 15–21 must be regarded as a part of Paul’s speech at Antioch. See on this problem Schlier, *Galater*, 87f.

<sup>136</sup> This was recognized, without the formal considerations, by Schlier, *Galater*, 87f.

from the *narratio* as a whole. Verses 17f. contain the points of disagreement, again probably using language borrowed from the opposition. Verses 19f. are an extremely concise summary of the argument to be elaborated upon later. Verse 21 concludes with a sharp denial of a charge.<sup>137</sup> Paul does not use *partitio* or *enumeratio* because there is only one point<sup>138</sup> against which a defense has to be made (2:17).<sup>139</sup>

(d) *The Probatio* (3:1–4:31)

The most decisive part of the speech is the one presenting the “proof.”<sup>140</sup> This part determines whether or not the speech as a whole will succeed. *Exordium* and *narratio* are only preparatory steps leading up to this central part. The purpose of the *probatio* (as Quintilian calls it)<sup>141</sup> or the *confirmatio* (as Cicero<sup>142</sup> and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*<sup>143</sup> call it) is to establish credibility for the defense by a system of arguments.<sup>144</sup> Because of the importance of the *probatio*, the Greco-Roman rhetoricians have devoted the major portions of their works to it. Understandably, there is also considerable difference of opinion in regard to the classification, distribution and effectiveness of individual forms and types of arguments.

Viewing Galatians from a rhetorical perspective suggests at once that chapters 3 and 4 must contain the *probatio* section. Admittedly, an analysis of these chapters in terms of rhetoric is extremely difficult. One might say that Paul has been very successful—as a skilled rhetorician would be expected to be—in disguising his argumentative strategy. That is to say, in spite of the apparent confusion, there is to be expected a clear flow of thought. What makes these chapters look so confusing is the frequent interruption of the argumentative sections by dialogue, examples, proverbs, quotations, etc. But this is in conformity with the requirements of Hellenistic rhetoric. In fact, for the rhetoricians of Paul’s time there could be nothing more boring than a perfect product of rhetorical technology.<sup>145</sup> Therefore, the appearance of an argument as a “dead” system of inescapable and pre-formed syllogisms had to be avoided; instead, the arguments were to be presented in a “lively” way. Quintilian’s advice is to achieve “diversity by a thousand figures.”<sup>146</sup> Paradoxically, extremely perfected logic

<sup>137</sup> Cf. the connections with the *exordium* (1:6 f.) and the *recapitulatio* (6:12–16).

<sup>138</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 4.5.8: “Itaque, si plura vel obicienda sunt vel diluenda, et utilis et iucunda partitio est, ut quo quaque de re dicturi sumus ordine appareat; at, si unum crimen varie defendemus, supervacua.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §347.

<sup>139</sup> Gal 2:17 apparently contains the “charge,” as Paul phrases it: εἰ δὲ ζητοῦντες δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ εὐρέθημεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτωλοί, ἄρα Χριστὸς ἁμαρτίας διάκονος; Cf. 2:2–4, 14; 5:11; 6:12–16.

<sup>140</sup> On the *probatio* see esp. Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, §§16ff.; Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§348–430.

<sup>141</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 5, prooemium 5. The Greek term is πίστις (Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.13.4 [1414b]), which Quintilian thinks is best rendered by the Latin *probatio* (*Inst.* 5.10.8). See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§348–349.

<sup>142</sup> Cicero, *Inv.* 1.24.34.

<sup>143</sup> *Rhet. Her.* 1.10.18.

<sup>144</sup> See the definition given by Cicero, *Inv.* 1.24.34: “Confirmatio est per quam argumentando nostrae causae fidem et auctoritatem et firmamentum adiungit oratio.”

<sup>145</sup> See Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.14.27–35.

<sup>146</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.14.32. See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §257.

was thought to create suspicion and boredom, not credibility, while a carefully prepared mixture of some logic, some emotional appeal, some wisdom, some beauty, and some entertainment was thought to conform to human nature and to the ways in which human beings accept arguments as true. Gal 3 and 4 are such a “mixture.”

The beginning of the *probatio* section (3:1–5) reveals interesting aspects. The particular “case” in which Paul is involved is constituted by two components. First, there is agreement on the *factum* itself but disagreement on the question of whether the *factum* is right or wrong. Therefore, the argument pertains not to the *factum* itself, but to its *qualitas*. Thus the defense must try to prove that the *factum* was legal (*iure, recte*):<sup>147</sup> this includes also a defense of the *auctor* of that *factum*.<sup>148</sup> In the case of the Galatians, the *factum* is not disputed because the founding of the Galatian churches by Paul is not questioned by any of the parties.<sup>149</sup> The question is rather whether this foundation was done rightfully or “in vain.”<sup>150</sup>

Secondly, the addressees of the letter, that is, the hearers of the arguments, are also the eye-witnesses of the evidence.<sup>151</sup> This situation provides the writer of the letter with the possibility of proceeding as if the eye-witnesses are “in court.”<sup>152</sup> Paul makes full use of this opportunity in 3:1–5: by applying the “inductive method” which rhetoricians trace back to Socrates<sup>153</sup> he enters into his first argument by an *interrogatio* of these witnesses.<sup>154</sup> In every case the answers to the questions are self-evident and need not be recorded. Paul is not only fortunate in being able to question the eye-witnesses themselves,<sup>155</sup> but he also compels them to produce the strongest of all possible defense arguments, undeniable evidence.<sup>156</sup> This undeniable evidence is the gift of the Spirit, which the Galatians themselves have experienced.

The gift of the Spirit was an ecstatic experience.<sup>157</sup> Together with the miracles which are being performed at present among the Galatians,<sup>158</sup> this constitutes

<sup>147</sup> On the *status qualitatis* see Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, §7; Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§89, 123–130, 134–136, 171–196.

<sup>148</sup> Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§126, 175, who refers to Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.6.79: “... *qualitatis duplex ratio facienda sit, altera qua et factum defenditur, altera qua tantum reus.*”

<sup>149</sup> See Gal 1:6–9, 11; 3:1–5; 4:13–15.

<sup>150</sup> See εἰκὴ Gal 3:4; 4:11; cf. also 2:2, 15–21; 5:2–12; 6:12–16.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. 3:1: . . . οἷς κατ’ ὀφθαλμοὺς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς προεγράφη ἐσταυρωμένος; Also this statement uses a rhetorical *topos*; see Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §810, and index, s.v. *oculus, conspectus*.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.15.15f. (1376a); Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.7.1f., and Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §354.

<sup>153</sup> See Cicero, *Inv.* 1.31.51: “*Inductio est oratio quae rebus non dubiis captat assensiones eius quicum instituta est; quibus assensionibus facit ut illi dubia quaedam res propter similitudinem earum rerum quibus assensit probetur; velut apud Socraticum Aeschinen demonstrat Socrates.*” 53: “*Hoc modo sermonis plurimum Socrates usus est propterea quod nihil ipse afferre ad persuadendum volebat, sed ex eo quod sibi ille dederat quicum disputabat, aliquid conficere malebat, quod ille ex eo quod iam concessisset necessario approbare deberet.*” Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.11.3–5, and Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§419–421.

<sup>154</sup> On the *interrogatio* see the treatment by Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.7.8–37, and Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §354.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.7.1: “*Maximus tamen patronis circa testimonia sudor est. Ea dicuntur aut per tabulas aut a praesentibus.*”

<sup>156</sup> Cf. Cicero, *Inv.* 1.32.53: “*Hoc in genere praecipendum nobis videtur primum, ut illud quod inducimus per similitudinem eiusmodi sit ut sit necesse concedere.*”

<sup>157</sup> For a discussion of this point see Betz, “Spirit.”

<sup>158</sup> Gal 3:5: . . . ἐνεργῶν δυνάμεις ἐν ὑμῖν . . .

evidence of supernatural origin and character—that is, for ancient rhetoric, evidence of the highest order.<sup>159</sup>

If, as Paul presumes, the evidence is accepted, his readers will have to make a necessary concession: the experience of the Spirit and the occurrence of the miracles did not come about ἐξ ἔργων νόμου but ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ.<sup>160</sup> This is evident because at the time of this experience the Galatians had no doubt heard the proclamation of the gospel,<sup>161</sup> but being outside of the Torah they could not have produced “works of the Torah.” This, Paul argues, proves his main point, “justification by faith” instead of “by works of the Torah” (cf. 2:16). The *interrogatio* (3:1–5) thus also prepares the ground for the next major argument, the argument from Scripture (3:6ff.).

Naturally, proof from Scripture is not a subject treated by the ancient rhetoricians. One can presuppose, however, that in a primitive Christian context such proofs were accepted with a very high degree of *auctoritas*.<sup>162</sup> Scripture would have to be classified as written, documentary evidence.<sup>163</sup> Because of its divine inspiration this evidence would come close to that of oracles or divine law.<sup>164</sup> In any case, it would have to be treated as equal to the “inartificial proof.”<sup>165</sup>

In terms of rhetoric, the passage Gal 3:6–18 does not figure merely as “Scripture proof,” but also as an *exemplum*.<sup>166</sup> Generally, *exempla* belong to the *genus artificiale*.<sup>167</sup> Their relationship to the *auctoritas*, which also belongs to the *genus artificiale*, was recognized.<sup>168</sup> The figure of Abraham would be classified as a “historical example.”<sup>169</sup> This gives it a high rank, as far as credibility is concerned, a rank

<sup>159</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.7.35: “His adicere si qui volet ea quae divina testimonia vocant, ex responsis oraculis omnibus, duplicem sciat esse eorum tractatum: generalem alterum, in quo inter Stoicos et Epicuri sectam secutos pugna perpetua est regaturne providentia mundus, specialem alterum circa partis divinationum, ut quaeque in quaestionem cadet.” Quintilian has also comments about the ambiguity of such divine testimonies (5.7.36). See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §176; Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, 239.

<sup>160</sup> Gal 3:2, 5.

<sup>161</sup> Gal 3:2, 5: ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως.

<sup>162</sup> On this subject see esp. Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.11.36–42. Quintilian mentions among such arguments the precepts of the Seven Wise Men and lines from poets, particularly Homer, and makes this remark (5.11.39): “Nam sententiis quidem poetarum non orationes modo sunt refertae, sed libri etiam philosophorum, qui quamquam inferiora omnia praeceptis suis ac litteris credunt, repetere tamen auctoritatem a plurimis versibus non fastidierunt.” See also Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §426.

<sup>163</sup> See Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.5.1–2; 5.7.1–2. Cf. also Aristotle on συγγραφαί (*Rhet.* 1.2.2 [1355b]; 1.15.20–25 [1376b]), on ancient witness 1.15.17 (1376b).

<sup>164</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.11.42: “Ponitur a quibusdam, et quidem in parte prima, deorum auctoritas, quae est ex responsis, ut ‘Socraten esse sapientissimum.’ Id rarum est, non sine usu tamen. . . . Quae cum propria causae sunt, divina testimonia vocantur, cum aliunde arcessuntur, argumenta.”

<sup>165</sup> Cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.11.43, where also the reason is stated: “quod ea non inveniret orator, sed acciperet.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§351–354.

<sup>166</sup> On *exempla* see Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, §23; Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§410–426.

<sup>167</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.11.1 describes it thus: “Tertium genus, ex iis quae extrinsecus adducuntur in causam, Graeci vocant παράδειγμα, quo nomine et generaliter usi sunt in omni similium adpositione et specialiter in iis quae rerum gestarum auctoritate nituntur.” This definition is found in 5.11.6: “Potentissimum autem est inter ea quae sunt huius generis quod proprie vocamus exemplum, id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod intenderis commemoratio.” See also Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §410.

<sup>168</sup> See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§410, 426.

<sup>169</sup> See *ibid.*, §§411–414.

which would be heightened even more because of the position of reverence which Abraham enjoyed in both Judaism and Christianity. Furthermore, the promise God made to Abraham<sup>170</sup> falls into the category of *res gesta*. Consequently, since the “sons of Abraham,” for whose benefit the covenant was made, are in fact identical with the Galatians themselves,<sup>171</sup> the covenant amounts to a *praeiudicium*,<sup>172</sup> another proof of the highest degree (*genus inartificiale*). That Paul thinks not only in terms of Scripture proof but also in legal terms is underscored by the fact that he refers to an analogy from law<sup>173</sup> and inserts an “excursus” on the Torah (3:19–25) as a negative backdrop to the covenant of Abraham.<sup>174</sup>

A “definition” of the Galatians’ status before God is set forth in 3:26–28. As I have tried to show in a recent article,<sup>175</sup> this definition shows an interesting formal structure, which resembles in some ways the “macarism.” There is also reason to believe that Paul lifted the composition almost in its entirety from another, perhaps baptismal, context in order to “quote” it here. If this hypothesis is assumed, the “quotation” would function here as a “reminder.”

The argument 3:6–18 is joined with the “macarism” in 3:29 and is repeated after some further explanation in 4:7. As the explanation in 4:4–6, which contains perhaps another “quotation” from earlier tradition, brings out, 3:26–28 does not introduce a new argument but merely reactivates the first argument, the evidence of the experience of the Spirit (3:1–5). Therefore, the entire section 3:26–4:7 joins together the argument from the evidence of the Spirit (3:1–5) with the argument from Scripture (3:6–18, 25). The conclusion of the second major argument occurs in 4:1–11. After stating again the religious “achievements” of the Galatians (4:8–9a), Paul returns to the interrogatio (cf. 3:1–5), asking, πῶς ἐπιστρέφετε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα, οἷς πάλιν ἄνωθεν δουλεῦσαι θέλετε; (4:9c). This question, the answer to which is self-explanatory, must be seen in juxtaposition with the earlier question in 3:3: ἐναρξάμενοι πνεύματι, νῦν σαρκὶ ἐπιτελείσθε; In the same way, the final warning in 4:11 (φοβοῦμαι ὑμᾶς μή πως εἰκὴ κεκοπίακα εἰς ὑμᾶς) repeats the previous warning of 3:4 (τοσαῦτα ἐπάθετε εἰκὴ; εἴ γε καὶ εἰκὴ).<sup>176</sup>

As all commentators point out, the interpretation of the section 4:12–20 presents considerable difficulties. In a disconnected way Paul seems to jump from one point to the next, leaving in obscurity which points he is jumping from and to.<sup>177</sup>

<sup>170</sup>Note the term διαθήκη, Gal 3:15, 17; 4:24.

<sup>171</sup>Gal 3:26–4:7, 28, 31.

<sup>172</sup>This is Quintilian’s term. See his definition of the various forms of *praeiudicia* in *Inst.* 5.2.1: “*Iam praeiudiciorum vis omnis tribus in generibus versatur: rebus quae aliquando ex paribus causis sunt iudicatae, quae exempla rectius dicuntur, ut de rescissis patrum testamentis vel contra filios confirmatis: iudicii ad ipsam causam pertinentibus, unde etiam nomen ductum est . . . aut cum de eadem causa pronuntiatum est.*” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §353, for further material.

<sup>173</sup>Gal 3:15, 17; 4:1–3.

<sup>174</sup>Cf. *Rhet. Her.* 2.13.19: “*Iudicatum est id de quo sententia lata est aut decretum interpositum. Ea saepe diversa sunt, ut aliud alio iudici aut praetori aut consuli aut tribuno plebis placitum sit; et fit ut de eadem re saepe aliud decreverit aut iudicarit.*”

<sup>175</sup>See above, n. 157.

<sup>176</sup>Cf. also Gal 2:2, 5.

<sup>177</sup>Cf. Oepke, *Galater*, 140f., who makes the most of this: “Nun schlägt die Leidenschaft völlig in heißes Liebeswerben um. Durch den abgerissenen, oft überkurzen Ausdruck ist das Verständnis

However, the section becomes understandable when interpreted in the light of epistolography: 4:12–20 contains a string of *topoi* belonging to the theme of friendship, a theme which was famous in ancient literature.<sup>178</sup> More importantly, it was customary to use material from the *topos* περὶ φιλίας in the *probatio* section of speeches<sup>179</sup> as well as in letters.<sup>180</sup> Quintilian includes the material among the various types of *exempla*.<sup>181</sup> The argumentative value of such *topoi* results from the fact that their truth was to be taken for granted. Compared with the preceding arguments, however, the friendship *topos* can claim only a lower degree of persuasiveness.<sup>182</sup> Yet, given the rather “heavy” character of the argumentation in 3:1–4:11, this insertion of an “easier” and more emotional section is entirely in order, when one judges the matter according to the tastes of ancient rhetoric.<sup>183</sup>

Paul concludes the *probatio* section with the “allegory” of Sarah, Hagar and their sons (4:21–31).<sup>184</sup> He himself indicates by his words ἅτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα (4:24) that he wants to interpret the Abraham tradition and the verses from Scripture according to the allegorical method.<sup>185</sup> In regard to the composition of the letter, this poses two questions: why does Paul insert this allegory at the end of the *probatio* section<sup>186</sup> and what argumentative force does he attribute to it?

Quintilian has some advice to offer in regard to the distribution of arguments in the *probatio* section.<sup>187</sup> He favors the opinion that the strongest argument should either come at the beginning, or should be divided between the beginning and the end. He clearly rejects an order “descending from the strongest proofs to the weakest.”<sup>188</sup> Yet allegory does not seem to be a strong proof, if we examine what some of

erschwert. Rein verstandesmäßige Zergliederung führt solch einem Text gegenüber nicht zum Ziel.” Burton, *Galatians*, 235, believes that Paul is “dropping argument.”

<sup>178</sup> See for references and bibliography G. Stählin, *φίλος*, *κτλ*, 9:144ff.; Treu, “Freundschaft.”

<sup>179</sup> Cf. e.g., Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.11.41, who quotes as the first example the proverb: “*Ubi amici, ibi opes*” (see below, n. 181). See also Steinmetz, *Freundschaftslehre*.

<sup>180</sup> See Koskeniemi, *Studien*, 115ff.; Brinckmann, *Begriff*; Thraede, *Grundzüge*.

<sup>181</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.11.41: “*Ea quoque quae vulgo recepta sunt hoc ipso, quod incertum auctorem habent, velut omnium fiunt, quale est: ‘ubi amici, ibi opes’ et ‘conscientia mille testes,’ et apud Ciceronem: ‘pares autem, ut est in vetere proverbio, cum paribus maxime congregantur; neque enim durassent haec in aeternum nisi vera omnibus viderentur.’*”

<sup>182</sup> Cf. Quintilian’s discussion, *Inst.* 5.11.43–44.

<sup>183</sup> See the discussion in Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.12.3ff.; and Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §413.

<sup>184</sup> The connection between this allegory and Hellenistic rhetoric is seen and discussed by van Stempvoort, *Allegorie*, 16ff. Cf. also the relationship between Seneca, *Ep.* 88.24–28, and Philo’s allegory in *De congressu eruditionis gratia*; on this see Stuckelberger, *Senecas 88e Brief*, 60ff.

<sup>185</sup> Actually, Paul employs both “allegory” and “typology.” For this method see Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, 429ff.; Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§895–901; Pépin, *Mythe et Allégorie*; Buffière, *Mythes d’Homère*; Barr, *Old and New*, 103ff.

<sup>186</sup> Many scholars see the problem, but explain the matter psychologically by calling the passage “an afterthought” (see e.g., Burton, *Galatians*, 251; Schlier, *Galater*, 216; Luz, “Der Bund, 319; Mussner, *Galaterbrief*, 316f., or as the result of a “Diktierpause” (Oepke, *Galater*, 147; Stange, “Diktierpausen,” 115).

<sup>187</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.12.1ff.

<sup>188</sup> Quintilian, *Inst.* 5.12.14: “*Quaesitum etiam potentissima argumenta primone ponenda sint loco, ut occupent animos, an summo, ut inde dimittant, an partita primo summoque, ut Homerica dispositione in medio sint infirma aut animis crescant. Quae prout ratio causae cuiusque postulabit ordinabuntur, uno (ut ego censeo) excepto, ne a potentissimis ad levissima decrescat oratio.*”

the rhetoricians have to say. Being related to the exemplum and to the metaphor, allegory is included among the *figurae per immutationem*.<sup>189</sup> Its argumentative force is weakened by its ambiguity.<sup>190</sup> One could, therefore, come to the conclusion that the allegory in 4:21–31 is the weakest of the arguments in the *probatio* section. In this case, Paul's composition would be subject to a criticism like the one offered by Quintilian.

It is interesting, however, that a more positive evaluation becomes possible, if we follow the advice of Pseudo-Demetrius.<sup>191</sup> This author argues that “direct” (ἀπλῶς) arguments are not always the most effective ones. “Any darkly-hinting expression is more terror-striking, and its import is variously conjectured by different hearers. On the other hand, things that are clear and plain are apt to be despised, just like men when stripped of their garments.”<sup>192</sup> As evidence the author refers to the mysteries: “Hence the Mysteries are revealed in an allegorical form in order to inspire such shuddering and awe as are associated with darkness and night. Allegory also is not unlike darkness and night.”<sup>193</sup> When we consider that in the Christian context the Abraham tradition holds the place which is occupied in the Mysteries by their own holy tradition, Paul's argument here becomes highly forceful.<sup>194</sup>

There may also be another rhetorical strategy at work. Pseudo-Demetrius follows the opinion of Theophrastus, saying “that not all possible points should be punctiliously and tediously elaborated, but some should be left to the comprehension and inference of the hearer. . . .”<sup>195</sup> The effect upon the hearer is this: “. . . when he perceives what you have left unsaid [he] becomes not only your hearer but your witness, a very friendly witness too. For he thinks himself intelligent because you have afforded him the means of showing his intelligence. It seems like a slur on your hearer to tell him everything as though he were a simpleton.”<sup>196</sup>

In the light of the foregoing rhetorical considerations the place and function of the allegory 4:21–31 becomes explainable. Paul had concluded the previous section in 4:20 with a confession of perplexity (. . . ὅτι ἀποροῦμαι ἐν ὑμῖν). Such a confession was a rhetorical device, seemingly admitting that all previous arguments have failed

<sup>189</sup> Cf. the definition in *Rhet. Her.* 4.34.46: “*Permutatio [ἀλληγορία] est oratio aliud verbis aliud sententia demonstrans.*” See also Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§421, 564, 755ff., 894, 895–901.

<sup>190</sup> Because of its ambiguity, “allegory” can easily go over into “*aenigma*.” See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §899.

<sup>191</sup> Cf. Demetrius, *Eloc.* 2.99–101, 151, 222, 243 (Roberts, LCL).

<sup>192</sup> Demetrius, *Eloc.* 2.100.

<sup>193</sup> Demetrius, *Eloc.* 2.101: Διὸ καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ἐν ἀλληγορίαις λέγεται πρὸς ἐκπληξιν καὶ φρίκην, ὥσπερ ἐν σκότῳ καὶ νυκτί. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀλληγορία τῷ σκότῳ καὶ τῇ νυκτί. On allegory in connection with the mysteries see esp. Griffiths, “Allegory”; Plutarch's *De Iside*, 100f; Merkelbach, *Roman und Mysterium*, 55ff.

<sup>194</sup> Cf. the function of the allegory in Philo; see esp. Brandenburger, *Fleisch und Geist*, 200f.; Christiansen, *Technik*.

<sup>195</sup> Demetrius, *Eloc.* 4.222: . . . ὅτι οὐ πάντα ἐπ' ἀκριβείας δεῖ μακρηγορεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔνια καταλιπεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀκροατῇ συνιέναι, καὶ λογίζεσθαι ἐξ αὐτοῦ.

<sup>196</sup> Demetrius, *Eloc.* 4.222: συνεῖς γὰρ τὸ ἐλλειφθὲν ὑπὸ σοῦ οὐκ ἀκροατὴς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μάρτυς σου γίνεται, καὶ ἅμα εὐμενέστερος. συνετὸς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ δοκεῖ διὰ σέ τὸν ἀφορμὴν παρεσχηκότα αὐτῷ τοῦ συνιέναι, τὸ δὲ πάντα ὡς ἀνοήτῳ λέγειν καταγινώσκοντι ἔοικεν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ.

to convince.<sup>197</sup> Then, in 4:21 he starts again by asking the Galatians to tell the answer themselves: Λέγετέ μοι, . . . τὸν νόμον οὐκ ἀκούετε; In other words, the allegory allows Paul to return to the *interrogatio* method used in 3:1–5 by another route.<sup>198</sup> There this method was employed to force the Galatians to admit as eye-witnesses that the evidence speaks for Paul, an admission that leaves them in the situation of “simpletons” (ἀνόητοι). However, people who are to be persuaded should not be left in a situation of such low regard. By his confession of perplexity in 4:20 Paul removes himself from the haughty position of one who has the total command of the arguments. Through the allegory he lets the Galatians find the “truth” for themselves, thus convincing themselves, and at the same time clearing themselves from the blame of being ἀνόητοι Γαλάται. The conclusion (4:31), now stated in the first person plural, includes the readers among those who render judgment.<sup>199</sup> Moreover, the conclusion of 4:31 is not only the résumé of the meaning of the allegory 4:21–31, but of the entire *probatio* section, thus anticipating that the whole argument has convinced the audience.

#### (e) *The Paraenesis* (5:1–6:10)

The last part of the “body” of the Galatian letter consists of *paraenesis* (5:1–6:10). That much can be said in spite of the difficulties arising from a discussion of the matter.<sup>200</sup>

It is surprising that there only exist a few investigations of the formal character and function of epistolary *paraenesis*.<sup>201</sup> M. Dibelius’ definition is clearly too vague: “Paränese nennt man eine Aneinanderreihung verschiedener, häufig unzusammenhängender Mahnungen mit einheitlicher Adressierung.”<sup>202</sup> H. Cancik,<sup>203</sup> utilizing the method of language analysis, distinguished between two forms of argument in Seneca’s epistles, that of “descriptive” and that of “prescriptive” language.<sup>204</sup> This distinction corresponds to the two means of argument, the “rational” and the “emotive.” Cancik points out that the scholarly argument is facilitated not only by “descriptive” language, but by “prescriptive” as well, so that *paraenesis* cannot be regarded as a

<sup>197</sup> For the epistolographic cliché cf., e.g., Isocrates, *Ep.* 2.24; 8.8. It is related to the rhetorical *dubitatio*, examples of which are found in Acts 25:20; Hermas *Sim.* 8.3.1; 9.2.5, 6. See Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§776–778.

<sup>198</sup> Cf. my discussion of the *interrogatio*, above.

<sup>199</sup> Διό, ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἔσμεν παιδίσκης τέκνα ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐλευθέρως.

<sup>200</sup> Differently Merk, “Der Beginn,” who provides a useful survey of the various opinions in regard to the beginning of the paraenesis. However, since the conclusions are not based upon a composition analysis they are not convincing.

<sup>201</sup> Investigations are usually aimed at elements of paraenesis, rather than the paraenetical section of the letter; for bibliography see Doty, *Letters*, 49ff. For the larger question and bibliography see Gaiser, *Protrepitik*; Rabbow, *Seelenführung*, esp. 370f.; Hadot, *Seneca*; Peter, *Der Brief*, 225ff.

<sup>202</sup> Dibelius, *Geschichte*, 2:65. Dibelius’ treatment of the subject (65–76) is little more than a random collection of diverse material from a wide range of authors. See also his *Formgeschichte*, 234–65, esp. 239ff.

<sup>203</sup> Cancik, *Untersuchungen*. See the review of this important dissertation by Maurach; and Maurach, *Bau*, passim.

<sup>204</sup> Cancik, *Untersuchungen*, 16ff.

“Kümmerform,” which is deficient of logic and merely applies the result of rational theory.<sup>205</sup> She also distinguishes between simple elements of *paraenesis* (series of prescriptions, prohibitions, exhortations, warnings, etc.) and combinations of these with descriptive elements. In addition we have to take into account *exempla*, comparisons, etc.<sup>206</sup>

It is rather puzzling to see that *paraenesis* plays only a marginal role in the ancient rhetorical handbooks, if not in rhetoric itself.<sup>207</sup> Consequently, modern studies of ancient rhetoric also do not pay much attention to it.<sup>208</sup> On the other hand, *paraenesis* was characteristic of the philosophical literature, especially of the diatribes of the Hellenistic period.<sup>209</sup> In this material we find that “rhetoric” is denounced with regularity as nothing but concoctions of lifeless syllogisms.<sup>210</sup> The philosophical letters, which are most interesting to the student of Paul’s letters and of which we have a large number extant, very often have at the end a paraenetical section.<sup>211</sup> Striking as this phenomenon is, they have been the subject of only a few studies of these letters, none of which, to my knowledge, specifically investigates the paraenetical material. But in one of Seneca’s epistles (*Ep.* 85.1) we read what may be the major reason for including *paraenesis* in the philosophical letters: “I declare again and again that I take no pleasure in such proofs [sc. the syllogisms]. I am ashamed to enter the arena and undertake battle on behalf of gods and men armed only with an awl.”<sup>212</sup>

The paraenetical section of Galatians (5:1–6:10) can be subdivided into three parts. Each of the parts is recognizable by its restatement of the “indicative” of salvation.<sup>213</sup>

#### 1. Gal 5:1–12

- 5:1a A restatement of the “indicative” of salvation: τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμῶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν.
- 5:1b–12 A warning against taking up of the yoke of the Jewish Torah by submitting to circumcision.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>207</sup> Even Quintilian has no special treatment of it, but only incidentally refers to other orators as having a related doctrine; see *Inst.* 3.6.47; 9.2.103. According to Aristotle there are two kinds of “deliberative” speech: . . . τὸ μὲν προτροπή τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή (*Rhet.* 1.3.3 [1358b]). This doctrine is also found later (cf. *Rhet. Her.* 1.2.2; Quintilian, *Inst.* 9.4.130), but has no apparent connection to *paraenesis*.

<sup>208</sup> See Volkmann, *Rhetorik*, 294ff.; Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§61, 2; 1109; 1120; Ernesti, *Graecorum rhetoricae*, s.v. προτροπή, *suasio* (παράίνεσις, etc., is not even listed).

<sup>209</sup> See Oltramare, *Origines*; Capelle and Marrou, “Diatribes.”

<sup>210</sup> For further literature see Betz, *Apostel Paulus*, 57ff.

<sup>211</sup> See e.g., the analysis of Seneca’s *Ep.* 76 by Cancik, *Untersuchungen*, 18ff.

<sup>212</sup> Seneca, *Ep.* 85:1 (Gummere): “*Illud totiens testor, hoc me argumentorum genere non delectari. Pudet in aciem descendere pro dis hominibusque susceptam subula armatum.*” I am indebted to the passage by Cancik, *Untersuchungen*, 22f. See also Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung*, 69ff.

<sup>213</sup> The restatements refer to 4:31, the conclusion of the *probatio* section and, by implication, to the result of the entire preceding argument. Cf. the καὶ in 6:16 (14–15).

## 2. Gal 5:13–24

- 5:13a A restatement of the “indicative”: ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἐκλήθητε, ἀδελφοί.  
 5:13b–24 A warning against corruption by the σάρξ.

## 3. Gal 5:25–6:10

- 5:25a A restatement of the “indicative”: εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι, . . .  
 5:25b–6:6 A series of gnomic sentences<sup>214</sup> forming the positive exhortation.  
 6:7–9 An eschatological warning.  
 6:10 A summary statement of the *paraenesis*.<sup>215</sup>

## 4. The Function of the Letter

The formal analysis of Paul’s letter to the Galatians permits us to arrive at some conclusions with regard to its function. We must of course distinguish between the general functions of the letter as a means of communication, a question too difficult to go into at this point, and the specific functions of the Galatian letter.

The “apologetic letter” presupposes the real or fictitious situation of the court of law, with the jury, the accuser and the defendant. In the case of Galatians, the addressees are identical with the jury, with Paul being the defendant and his opponents the accusers. This situation makes Paul’s letter a self-apology. The form of the letter is necessary, because the defendant himself is prevented from appearing in person before the jury. Therefore, the letter must serve to represent its author.<sup>216</sup> Serving as a substitute, the letter carries the defense speech to the jury.

If one looks at the letter from the point of view of the rhetorician, the substitute is a poor one indeed. Being simply a lifeless piece of paper, it eliminates one of the most important weapons of the rhetorician, the oral delivery. The actual delivery of the speech includes a whole range of weapons relating to modulation of voice and to gestures.<sup>217</sup> In his remarks in 4:18–20<sup>218</sup> Paul shows that he is fully aware of the disadvantages connected with writing a letter instead of making a personal appearance.<sup>219</sup>

<sup>214</sup>The investigation of Paul’s gnomic sentences remains another desideratum of New Testament scholarship. For the form in general, see Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §§872–879; Horna, “Gnome, Gnomendichtung, Gnomologien,” *RE Sup.* 6:74–87; Fritz, *ibid.*, 87–90; Chadwick, *Sentences*; Fischel, *Rabbinic Literature*.

<sup>215</sup>The last words, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους τῆς πίστεως, corresponding to an epistolary cliché. See P.Oxy. 293.16; 294.31; 743.43; and Meecham, *Light*, 116.

<sup>216</sup>On this point see the studies by Koskeniemi, *Studien*, 88ff.; Funk, “Apostolic Parousia”; Thraede, *Grundzüge*, passim; and Karlsson, *Ideologie*.

<sup>217</sup>On the *pronuntiatio* see Lausberg, *Handbuch*, §1091.

<sup>218</sup>Gal 4:18f.: . . . καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ παρῆναι με πρὸς ὑμᾶς. . . ἤθελον δὲ παρῆναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅρτι καὶ ἀλλάξαι τὴν φωνὴν μου . . .

<sup>219</sup>I am indebted to Professor Gustav Karlsson (Uppsala and Berlin) for calling my attention to this epistolary *topos*.

Far more serious problems arise from the nature of the defense speech itself. The “apologetic letter” is by definition a part of rhetoric and, for that reason, limits its writer to the devices of the “art of persuasion.”<sup>220</sup> In its written form, such a letter can persuade its addressees only by its rational arguments.

The “art of persuasion” has its proper place in the courts of law. As antiquity saw it, this law court rhetoric is beset with a number of unpleasant characteristics which impinge upon the very things Paul wants to accomplish. Rhetoric, as antiquity understood it, has little in common with the “truth,” but it is the exercise of those skills that make people believe something to be true. For this reason, rhetoric is preoccupied with demonstrations, persuasive strategy, and psychological exploration of the audience, but it is not interested in establishing the truth itself. Consequently, people who are interested in the truth itself must be distrustful of the “art of persuasion,” because they know of its capacity for intellectual manipulation, dishonesty and cynicism. The effectiveness of rhetoric depends primarily upon the naïveté of the hearer, rather than upon the soundness of the case. Rhetoric works only as long as one does not know *how* it works.

Having to use this rather suspect form of logical argumentation becomes even more questionable when one realizes that *no* kind of rational argument can possibly defend the position Paul must defend. In effect, his defense amounts to a defense of the πνεῦμα which was given to the gentile Galatians outside of the Torah.<sup>221</sup> How can an irrational experience like the ecstatic experience of the divine Spirit be defended as legitimate if the means of such a defense are limited to those available to the “apologetic letter”?

It is quite obvious that the methods made available through the “art of persuasion” must necessarily be insufficient. It is fascinating to see that Paul is aware of these problems and how he tries to resolve them.

There is, first, the problem of the *auctoritas* of the arguments presented in the *probatio* section of the letter. We have pointed out previously that all arguments are designed to demonstrate a supernatural *auctoritas*.

The other problem is that simple rhetoric would force Paul to leave the question of the gift of the divine Spirit—that is, a question of ultimate truth—to be decided by a jury which would ordinarily not be equipped to judge a matter of this order. Paul solves this problem by formally addressing the Galatians as οἱ πνευματικοί (Gal 6:1), a designation they probably claimed for themselves. Who could be better judges of matters concerning the πνεῦμα than οἱ πνευματικοί? There is thus an implicit connection between the presupposition that the Galatians have received the divine Spirit and the apostle’s confidence that they will be able to follow and appreciate the logical arguments presented in his defense letter. The ground for such confidence is that as possessors of the Spirit they do not simply rely on common sense.

However, the apostle finally overcomes the limitations of the “apologetic letter” by yet another feature. The Galatian letter begins with a conditional curse, very

<sup>220</sup> For a more extensive discussion of this problem see Betz, “In Defense.”

<sup>221</sup> See my discussion of Paul’s defense, above.

carefully constructed, cursing every Christian who dares to preach a gospel different from that Paul had preached and still preaches, different from the gospel that the Galatians had accepted (1:8–9). At the end, the letter pronounces a corresponding conditional blessing upon those who remain loyal to the Pauline gospel (6:16).

What does this imply for the literary function of the letter? It means that as the carrier of curse and blessing the letter becomes a “magical letter,” another category among ancient letters.<sup>222</sup> In other words, Paul does not simply rely on the “art of persuasion” and its system of rational argumentation, although this system is used to yield as much as it can. He does not leave things to be decided by the reasonableness of the Galatians, although their reason is supposedly informed by the Spirit of God. He also introduces the dimension of magic, that is, the curse and the blessing, as inescapable instruments of the Spirit, in order to confront the Galatians with the choice between salvation and condemnation. Reading the letter will automatically produce the “judgment.” The readers will either go free and be acquitted, or they will be sent back to the cosmic “prison” guarded by the στοιχῆα τοῦ κόσμου (cf. 3:23ff.; 4:8–10). By including this dimension of magic Paul repeats the Galatians’ initial confrontation with the gospel (cf. 1:9). Having read the letter they see themselves transferred back into the moment when they first encountered the gospel, so that suddenly Paul’s defense of the Spirit coincides with the proclamation of the gospel of the crucified Jesus Christ.

<sup>222</sup>No satisfactory investigation of the genre exists. J. Sykutris mentions it in his article “Epistolographie,” 5:207; see also J. Schneider, “Brief,” *RAC* 2:572f.; R. Stübe, *Der Himmelsbrief*. Both authors refer to the *Papyri graecae magicae* as examples. Actually, the oldest letter in Greek literature is a magical letter (Homer, *Il.* 6.167ff.). In a conversation with Dr Jan Bergman of Uppsala it became clear that there may be also yet unexplored connections with ancient Egyptian funerary inscriptions; see Sottas, *Preservation*; E. Otto, *Biographischen Inschriften*, 53ff. These inscriptions are like magical letters from the dead, addressing the potential visitor of the tomb, and threatening him with a curse, if he is a grave robber; for those who perform the correct ritual there is a blessing. See further, Gardiner and Sethe, *Egyptian Letters*, nos. 4, 5; Bjorck, *Der Fluch*.